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The Nineteenth Century in Ruins: A Genealogy of French Historical Epistemology 
David M. Peña-Guzmán, Laurentian University 
 
ABSTRACT: This article investigates the historical and philosophical background of the French 
tradition of historical epistemology. As a sort of ‘historical epistemology of historical 
epistemology,’ it traces some of the forces, incidents, and events that made possible (and perhaps 
even necessary) the emergence of a new way of doing epistemology in the first half of the 
twentieth century in France. Three developments that occupy a position privilege in this narrative 
are: (i) the collapse of German idealism, (ii) the birth of French positivism, and (iii) what the 
author calls ‘the crisis in the theory of science’ that swept over Europe in the early 1900s. These 
developments suggest that the emergence and development of historical epistemology was the 
effect of changes internal to the history of Western philosophy (from Kant to Comte) as much as a 
function of changes external to this history (including changes in the material fabric of society).  
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The “philosophy of the concept” was historically tied to the French tradition, ultimately 
traceable to Comte, of the history and philosophy of science. In the latter half of the twentieth 
century, this tradition was primarily represented by Gaston Bachelard and his successor as 
director of the Sorbonne’s Institut d’Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques, Georges Canguilhem. 
Although the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem was scarcely known outside France, where 
French philosophy was simply identified with existential phenomenology, they were major 
influences on several generations of French philosophy students and their “philosophy of the 
concept” remained a significant alternative to existential philosophy. 
Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century1 
  
Introduction 
It is generally agreed by scholars that the French school of ‘historical epistemology’ first appeared 
in the years leading up to the rise of the Vichy regime, during the tumultuous decades of the 
                                                     
1 Gary Gutting, French Philosophy on The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
228. 
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1930s and ‘40s, in that “most venerable abode of French science:”2 the Sorbonne. In The Adventure 
of French Philosophy (2012), Alain Badiou traces its origins to the second and third decades of the 
twentieth century and, more specifically, to the tension between ‘two contrasting currents’ that 
came to dominate French thought “on the eve of the Great War”: “the philosophy of vital 
interiority” founded in 1911 by Henri Bergson and the “philosophy of the mathematically-based 
concept” formulated by Léon Brunschvicg in 1912. 3  Meanwhile, Michel Foucault—himself a 
product of this tradition—suggests that, while the forces responsible for its appearance harken 
back to the nineteenth century, a critical event in the historical development of this tradition was 
the deliverance, in 1929, of Husserl’s famous Paris Lectures on transcendental phenomenology at 
the Descartes Amphitheater of the Sorbonne. These lectures introduced a whole generation of 
French thinkers (including Emmanuel Levinas, Jean Cavaillès, Alexandre Koyré and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, all of whom were in attendance) to the power of the phenomenological method, 
leading to two ‘heterogeneous’ uptakes of Husserlianism in France: one embodied by the 
existentialist writings of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas (the philosophers of the subject) and 
one embodied by the epistemological works of Bachelard and Canguilhem (the philosophers of 
the concept).4 
Curiously, the question that neither Badiou nor Foucault address in detail in their 
respective genealogies of historical epistemology is, perhaps, the one that matters most from a 
historico-epistemological point of view—that is to say, the question of historical epistemology’s 
own historical conditions of emergence. Why exactly did this mode of philosophical thought appear 
at this precise historical juncture in France? What questions, crises, and polemics preoccupied 
thinking and structured theoretical production on the European continent around this time-
period such that the stage was set for the appearance of a fundamentally new way of doing 
epistemology? Against the backdrop of what intellectual geographies and problematics did this 
new discourse assert itself? And how should we conceptualize the forces, energies, and incidents 
that contributed, directly or indirectly, to its genesis? Or, to borrow a line from Foucault’s 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” what are “the myriad events through—thanks to which, against 
which—[it was] formed”?5  
The narrative defended here maintains that the origins of historical epistemology—or, as 
some have called it, ‘the philosophy of the concept’—should be sought in the long nineteenth 
century, especially in its second half. During the second half of the nineteenth century—let us say, 
roughly, sometime between Hegel’s death in 1831 and Ricoeur’s birth in 1913—a series of events 
erupt in Europe that bring about a drastic failure in philosophical reason. The three that stand out 
in this regard are: (i) the death of German idealism, (ii) the birth of French positivism, and (iii) the 
                                                     
2 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion Cairns (Leiden, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1977), 1. 
3 Alain Badiou, The Adventure of French Philosophy (New York: Verso, 2012), lii-liii. 
4 Michel Foucault, “Preface,” The Normal and the Pathological by Georges Canguilhem (New York, New York: 
Zone Books, 1989), 8. 
5 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, genealogy, history," Semiotexte, vol. 3 (1978), 81.  
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emancipation of science from philosophy that occurs on account of the transition from (i) to (ii). 
These events uproot philosophy (in its guise as epistemology) from its historical self-
understanding as a normative discipline and call into question the traditionally normative 
character of its determinations. And, in so doing, they dissolve the fundamental ‘right’ that 
philosophy had historically arrogated for itself: the right to legislate, vis-à-vis a philosophical 
meta-language, universal norms for all rational thought.  
When philosophy loses the right to lay down the norms that all cognitively meaningful 
processes (including science) are supposed to obey, two things happen. First, philosophy is 
dethroned as the queen of the sciences and left in a bereaved and derelict state in which it is 
reduced, as it were, to the consciousness of its own deposition. Thus, in the late nineteenth 
century philosophy becomes a radical problem onto itself, especially as its very legitimacy gets 
tied up in a question mark. Second, the epistemic status of scientific reason becomes somewhat 
ambiguous. By the end of the 1800s, scientific knowledge has proven to be both normative (in the 
sense that it generates its own concepts and norms without the guiding hand of philosophy) and 
historical (in the sense that undergoes upheavals and revolutions that alter, over the course of 
historical time, the form and content of its discourse). But by this time, philosophy has lost its 
normative function and science has been situated within the a-normative framework of the rising 
positivist dogma (which eschews the normative arsenal of ‘old philosophy’). As a result, it 
becomes thoroughly unclear how the new historico-normative truths secreted by the sciences 
(physics, chemistry, biology, statistics, etc.) are to be justified, and also by whom. How can 
science, after all, be normative (and therefore necessitating) and historical (and therefore 
contingent) at one and the same time? What is the epistemic standing of scientific judgments that 
straddle the line between the normative and the historical? And who will spearhead the labor of 
justifying positive science’s new historico-normative frame? What is or should be, in short, the 
proper relationship between science, normativity, and history? 
This last question, I argue, becomes the leading predicament of thought in Europe at the 
start of the twentieth century. It is the primal scene (taking this term from Freud’s writings) from 
which twentieth century philosophy is born and in relation to which it develops. Hence, it is in 
relation to it that most twentieth century philosophical discourses—from Austrian logical 
positivism to German neo-Kantianism to French historical epistemology—must be interpreted, 
understood, and evaluated. Indeed, it seems to be in relation to it that the vast majority of 
discourses born in the first fifty to sixty years of the 1900s interpret, understand, and evaluate 
themselves.6 In what follows, I show that the writings of Cavaillès, Bachelard, Canguilhem and 
Foucault—which I take to be exemplary, though by no means exhaustive, of “historical 
epistemology”—emerge as a response to this primal scene, i.e., as a reaction to the crisis in 
scientific rationality and historical normativity that left nineteenth century philosophy in ruins 
                                                     
6 While this article focuses exclusively on historical epistemology, in the near future I intend to pursue the theme 
of how this theoretical predicament lies at the origin of other twentieth century philosophical pedigrees.  
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and that would eventually set the stage for a series of new philosophical ‘beginnings’ following 
the end of WWI.  
 
The Nineteenth Century In Ruins 
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), Jürgen Habermas argues that the life of modern 
philosophy from Kant to Hegel hinges on the theory of knowledge. Modern philosophy 
consumes itself in the task of elaborating a theory of knowledge that satisfies three fundamental 
demands: 
 
1. The demand for comprehensive unity. Against the ancient position that philosophy concerns 
itself solely with a specific kind of knowledge (knowledge of first principles), modern 
epistemology sets for itself the resplendent goal of explicating the formation and constitution 
of all possible knowledge (including knowledge accessed through pure, practical, and 
reflective judgment). In the modern period, all knowledge claims are treated as diverse 
elements that can, and must be, accommodated into a catholic theory of knowledge that 
leaves no cognitively meaningful sphere of life outside its dominion. 
 
2. The demand that scientific knowledge be included in philosophy’s object-domain. Although 
throughout much of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and some of the nineteenth centuries 
philosophy understands itself to be ‘science,’ it posits a fundamental difference between the 
knowledge it creates and the knowledge created by the positive sciences. More than simply 
marking the site of a dissimilitude, this difference marks the site of a bifurcation. Modern 
philosophy treats positive science (as much as morality, aesthetics and even politics) as 
provincial and derivative modes of reasoning that are explained and justified only by the 
logico-transcendental methods of philosophy itself. Philosophy is to science as explanans is to 
explanandum. 
 
3. The demand that philosophy be sovereign and legislative relative to its objects. From Descartes to 
Kant to Hegel, the idea that philosophy commissions philosophical truths that cannot be 
refuted or contradicted by non-philosophical knowledge is prevalent. And so is the notion 
that non-philosophical disciplines receive these truths not actively (as equals in a 
bidirectional dialogue) but passively (as subordinates in a medieval adoubement). As the 
queen of the sciences, philosophy decrees norms to which the sciences can only conform and 
through which alone they (the sciences, that is) can exist.  
 
Up until Hegel’s time, therefore, modern philosophy essentially circular. It defends its right to be 
sovereign on the grounds that only philosophical reason can explain all of knowledge’s 
manifestations, and it defends its claim that knowledge is one and that philosophy explains it on 
the grounds that knowledge can be unified through a normative meta-language that philosophy 
itself commissions.  
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This circularity is broken, however, in the late nineteenth century. The spirit of positive 
philosophy promulgated first by August Comte and later by Ernst Mach ‘liquidates,’ according to 
Habermas, epistemology as a theory of knowledge. In his Introduction to Positive Philosophy, 
Comte argues that knowledge reached via scientific principles of induction represents an 
‘advancement’ over knowledge reached via theological and metaphysical postulates. Human 
reason reaches its highest formulation when the ‘laws of phenomena’ of positive science replace 
the ‘supernatural agents’ of theology and the ‘abstract forces’ of metaphysics, thus reaching the 
apex of human history. At this peak of historical and cognitive development, the human mind is 
capable of shedding the skin of non-positive thought (i.e. theology and metaphysics) and 
mastering the study of both plurality (by discovering different laws of nature) and unity (by 
extracting from the study of science itself a “unified law of all science”7). And it is this very 
shedding that, according to Comte, “gives the positive philosophy […] universal character.”8 
Unfortunately, this shedding has a curious effect. On the one hand, it leads philosophy to 
slide back under the fold of metaphysics since the infamous ‘law of three stages’ (theology  
metaphysics  positivism) that anchors Comte’s entire operation remains a function of a 
philosophy of history knee-deep in metaphysics. On the other hand, it also leads philosophy to 
leap over the requirements of a robust theory of knowledge. Under the weight of the spirit of 
positivism, philosophical discourse cedes the very right that, from 1781 to 1867 or so, it had 
majestically arrogated for itself with the help of transcendental inquiry—i.e., the right to act as an 
oasis of epistemic norms. Philosophical discourse, in other words, is displaced from its legislative 
and normative role and recast as what Habermas describes as a “pseudo-normative regulation of 
established research.”9  
Before positivism, the purpose of philosophical reason was clear: to attain the highest form 
of knowledge available to the human species. After it, philosophical reason is restricted to the 
menial function of describing, organizing, and systematizing the factual-empirical knowledge 
secreted by the sciences, which are now viewed as autonomous or semi-autonomous domains. In 
Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas writes: 
 
Positivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge. In its place emerges the philosophy of 
science. Transcendental-logical inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge aims as well 
at explicating the meaning of knowledge as such. Positivism cuts off this inquiry, which it 
conceives as having become meaningless in virtue of the fact of the modern sciences. 
Knowledge is implicitly defined by the achievement of the sciences. Hence, transcendental 
inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge can be meaningfully pursued only in the 
form of methodological inquiry into the rules for the construction and corroboration of 
scientific theories.10 
                                                     
7 Auguste Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1988), 30-1. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
9 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972), 4. 
10 Ibid., 67. 
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Comte’s claims in Volume One of the Course on Positive Philosophy that metaphysics is an ‘absurd’ 
fancy that adds nothing of value to our stock of knowledge and that “it is only by the thorough 
observation of facts that we can arrive at the knowledge of logical laws”11 are clear signs that 
positivism’s interest lies in replacing the robustly normative self-understanding of modern 
philosophy with a gaunt philosophy of science in which the meaning of ‘knowledge’ is reduced to 
“what the sciences do.”12  
 The philosophy of the positive, moreover, claims the head of the philosophy of the subject 
since it replaces any inquiry into the faculties and capacities of the knowing subject—which, for 
the moderns, is the only way to secure the universal genesis of the knowledge relation—with a 
social-scientific reflection on the process of research itself. Habermas goes on to note that, 
 
The [positivist] philosophy of science renounces inquiry into the knowing subject. It orients 
itself directly toward the sciences, which are given as systems of propositions and procedures, 
that is, as a complex of rules according to which theories are constructed and corroborated. For 
an epistemology restricted to methodology, the subjects who proceed according to these rules 
lose their significance. Their deeds and destinies belong at best to the psychology of the 
empirical persons to whom the subjects of knowledge have been reduced. The latter have no 
import for the immanent elucidation of the cognitive process. The obverse of this restriction is 
the development through which logic and mathematics become independent, self-sufficient 
formal sciences, so that henceforth the problems of their foundations are no longer discussed in 
connection with the problem of knowledge.13 
 
On my view, this usurpation of the place once occupied by the idealist theory of knowledge (with 
its metaphysics, absolute principles, and the primacy of consciousness) by the new positivism 
yields two important consequences. One is that the sciences become ‘immunized’ against the 
critical and phenomenological prescriptions of philosophy. Another is that epistemology, once 
the bastion of modern philosophy, is reduced to an empty objectivism that can say little of value 
about how knowledge is possible in the first place. In Comte’s “ontology of the factual,” where 
empirical facts and natural laws reign supreme, the one fact left unexplained is paradoxically the 
fact of knowledge itself, i.e., the fact that knowledge is. The positivist eruption, Habermas 
poignantly notes, “knocks the bottom out of [metaphysics]”14 and, as a direct result, “the meaning 
of knowledge itself becomes irrational.”15  
 
The Role of Philosophical Meta-Languages  
                                                     
11 Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte; Volume 1, translated by Harriet Martineau (London, 
UK: Batoche Books, 2000), 36. 
12 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 67. 
13 Ibid., 68. 
14 Ibid., 81. 
15 Ibid., 69. 
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While I take Habermas’ account of the evolution of modern philosophy after Kant to be generally 
correct, I would like to controvert it on two specific points. First, as a point of clarification, it 
should be noted that the legislative function of modern epistemology is executed not simply 
through some all-purpose speculative operation, but through a highly specific philosophical 
maneuver: the construction of a second-order meta-language that issues, through logico-transcendental 
analysis, the philosophical norms that regulate all first-order judgments about the sensible world.  
It is conformity or unconformity with these philosophical norms—which, according to 
Webb, always come “from above” 16 —that determines the firmity or infirmity of non-
philosophical knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. If after Hegel, then, the theory of 
knowledge is annihilated in favor of a philosophy of science guided by positivist creed, this is 
because post-Hegelian developments make unthinkable what since Kant had been the linchpin to 
the philosopher’s self-understanding—i.e., the enunciation of a normatively-charged meta-
language upon which philosophy’s unifying function and legislative resolve depend.  
In Kant’s critical philosophy, for example, the justifiability of science depends not on 
whether or not our representations conform to the objects posited by science, but—and I take this 
to be pivot-point of the Copernican Revolution—on whether the objects posited in scientific 
judgment conform to our way of representing them. In Kant and the Philosophy of Science Today, 
Michela Massimi explains: “from a Kantian perspective, we gain scientific knowledge of nature 
by subsuming appearances under the a priori concepts of the understanding. Our scientific 
knowledge of nature is then confined to phenomena intended as objects of experience, i.e. as 
conceptually-determined appearances.”17  
True, Kant brings about this upheaval in epistemology by distilling from the sciences 
(especially Newtonian mechanics) certain suppositions and then re-casting them as the necessary 
and universal conditions for the constitution of all possible objects of experience and, therefore, of 
experience itself. In this regard, one could say that Kant begins not by legislating philosophical 
truths to the sciences, but by presupposing the legitimacy of scientific judgments and then 
building an edifice from them. But this would be misleading since there is a real sense, already at 
work in the Kantian text, that the distilling operation that founds reason’s architectonic is more 
than an audit of science’s conceptual assets. It is, in fact, an anointment that sanctions and codifies 
as statutory that which, for the sciences, exists only by force of fact. Where science finds only 
facts, philosophy finds norms. And once found, these norms do not bend in light of new facts.  
Once scientific suppositions are reinvented as philosophical norms, they acquire an extra-
scientific aura that no science (not even the Newtonian physics that inspired them) can disengage. 
And should positive science ever contravene the norms laid out in his philosophical meta-
language, Kant would most certainly say “then all the worse for science!” Indeed, he basically 
says as much in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), where he 
argues that if human reason wants to be taught by nature, it must first be taught by the queen of 
                                                     
16 David Webb, Foucault's Archaeology: Science and Transformation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 24. 
17 Michela Massimi, Kant And Philosophy Of Science Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.  
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the sciences. It learns from the latter how to approach nature with an armature of ‘principles’ that 
the queen herself provides and that nature itself cannot generate. “This,” Kant writes, “is how 
natural science was first bought to the secure course of a science after groping about for so many 
centuries.”18 
The birth of a new historical consciousness in the nineteenth century complicates the 
Kantian theory of knowledge without, however, upsetting its most fundamental intent. Hegel, 
that imponderable German philosopher who claims to be historical consciousness in the flesh, 
worries that the norms of the Kantian theory of knowledge carry on their sleeve, all too visibly, 
the a-historical sensibilities of their eighteenth century origins and that, as a result, they need to 
be surpassed by a new set of norms that opens itself up to the provocations of historical time.  
In Kant and the Nineteenth Century, W. T. Jones and Robert J. Fogelin argue that, for Hegel, 
the torpidity of Kant’s “synoptic table” threatened to bring about the dissolution of the theory of 
knowledge because the categories laid out on it are incapable of change and thus inadaptable to 
the needs of each historical moment. Being indistinguishable from “the pigeon-holes into which 
the postman tosses each day’s accumulation of letters and packages,”19 the norms of the Kantian 
meta-language are at once too abstract (not concrete) and too concretized (intractable). Thus, even 
if these norms were to succeed, for the sake of argument, at justifying the rational status of 
scientific knowledge at the level of its possibility, they would fail to do so at the level of its actuality. 
Actual knowledge grows. It changes and expands with the ebb and flow of phenomenal and 
historical time, and any theory of knowledge that wants to hold on to its legislative rights must be 
able to accommodate, from within itself, this historicity. With its adamant inflexibility, Kant’s 
theory, then, might succeed at denying knowledge “in order to make room for faith.” But it fails 
horribly at the much more important task of making room for history. And this failure forecloses 
more than the relationship between philosophy and history; it also forecloses the very possibility 
upon which epistemology itself depends—the possibility of education.  
In the first Critique, and this is Hegel’s charge in the Phenomenology of Spirit, there is 
nothing new under the sun; what has been will be again, what has been done will be done again. 
And this means that there is no avenue in the critical philosophy for the education of 
consciousness since the latter will find nothing in the realm of experience other than what it itself 
has put into it. This suppression of the shock of the new robs experience of the right to surprise 
reason and renders the contents of experience constitutionally incapable of shaking up the 
formalism of raisonnement. Here, as Nietzsche notes in the “Preface” to the second edition of the 
Gay Science, there is nothing that can “leap forward” and “catch the spirit in the act.”20 
                                                     
18  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 109. 
19 W. T. Jones, Kant and the Nineteenth Century (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 115. 
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, translated by Walter 
Kaufman (London, UK: Vintage Books, 1974), 34. 
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Yet, in spite of its sweltering anti-Kantianism, the Hegelian attitude leaves the kernel of the 
Kantian project intact. Hegel agrees with Kant that philosophy’s mission is to construct, guided 
by metaphysics, a normative meta-language to which all forms of knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, are beholden. The only difference is that the subject of knowledge (now conceived as 
‘Spirit’) is regarded as capable of changing the categories of thought through experience—which 
Kant cannot allow. In Hegel’s work, the ‘moments’ in which the categories of experience are 
subjected to dialectical overturns themselves represent the philosophical norms or “rules for 
thinking”21 over and against which scientific knowledge and scientific history are to be measured. 
Indeed, the very advancement of consciousness through all these moments appears to be a meta-
norm or meta-directive that is depicted, in Hegel’s writing, as the logical development of ‘the 
Concept’ [das Begriff]. The logic of experience outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit (especially 
when read alongside ‘the logic of logic’ charted in the Logic) acts as the normative horizon within 
which scientific ideas, judgments, theories, and discoveries are to be fitted, framed, and 
evaluated. Particular sciences are ‘rational’ only to the extent that their concepts and attitude 
reflect this directive’s mode of coming to terms with itself. 
The still-Kantian legalism of the Hegelian standpoint is evident in Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature. Posch states that Hegel’s position concerning the acquisition of knowledge of nature is 
that only philosophy—here interpreted as the act of witnessing the dialectical movement of what 
is (i.e. ‘the Concept’)—can truly comprehend nature and legislate norms for knowledge.22 In his 
2010 “Introduction” to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, M.J. Petry echoes this argument and contends 
that Hegel’s Naturphilosophie bands together the descriptive methodology of phenomenological 
discourse and the normative edge of a catholic theory of knowledge in order to give a notional 
account of phenomena, and show that the history of science must be interpreted as the 
development of the Concept in its external as nature.23 Thus, the normative meta-language that 
Kant articulates in terms of categories and congeals into the unity of a table, Hegel articulates in 
terms of moments (Terry Pinkard calls them “essential moments”) and congeals into the unity of 
a teleology. In both cases, however, the modern desire to unify all possible knowledge under a 
normative discourse furnished by metaphysics rules the scene.  
With Hegel’s philosophy of the concept, the classical (i.e. modern) theory of knowledge 
makes its last stand. In Reason in the Age of Science, Georg-Hans Gadamer argues that 
 
 Hegel was the very last to dare to defend in his thinking the proud claim of philosophy to be 
the framework and comprehensive totality for all possible human knowing. To the extent that 
this was attempted after Hegel, it occurred within the academic horizon of the schools on the 
                                                     
21  Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Philosophical Legacies: Essays on the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and Their Contemporaries 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 107. 
22 Thomas Posch, “Hegel's criticism of Newton's physics: a reconsideration", in S. Houlgate, and S. Baur (ed.), A 
Companion to Hegel (United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing, 2011).  
23 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature: Volume I (London: Routledge, 1970). 
Peña-Guzmán: The nineteenth Century in Ruins 
168 
 
part of professors of philosophy and was no longer the world historical reality it had been in 
the visage of professor Hegel of Berlin.24  
 
After Hegel, as we have seen, epistemology is thrown into a deep crisis (thanks, in no small part, 
to the dissemination of Comte-style positivism). This crisis bars philosophy’s normative 
motivation, effectively making obsolete the philosophical norms previously commanded by the 
thrust of logico-transcendental analysis (either as critique as in Kant’s case or as 
phenomenological description as in Hegel’s). This crisis, in simple terms, leaves nineteenth 
century thought in ruins. 
It is quite telling that by the time the crisis recedes and a new world historical reality kicks 
into gear, the only “norms” recognized as legitimate are the non-philosophical norms of scientific 
procedure, i.e., those norms for the regulation of feedback-controlled action that reach theoretical 
climax in Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery from 1934. All other norms, including the 
substantive norms of rationality furnished by epistemology, fall off from the philosopher’s 
vocabulary. They are forgotten as remnants of a bygone stage of human thinking, as relics of that 
stage of human history that Comte would dismiss as ‘the metaphysical stage.’ 
Now, I emphasize the role that second-order, normative, philosophical meta-languages 
play in the modern theory of knowledge because this way of framing “the death of German 
idealism” allows us to better understand the transition from nineteenth- to twentieth-century 
philosophy and, concomitantly, the rise of French historical epistemology. But before turning to 
this transition, I would like to add another corrective to the Habermasian account of how the 
liquidation of this theory came about.  
According to Habermas, the crisis in the theory of knowledge was a solely intra-
philosophical affair. “Philosophy was dislodged from [its] position by philosophy,” he writes.25 
On this point, Habermas is mistaken. Surely, the historical transition from Kant to Hegel to 
Comte is affected by developments internal to philosophy, especially the rise of post-Hegelian 
modes of thought such as the materialism of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, the naturphilosophie of 
Schelling, the philosophy of existence of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. 
Indeed, the positivism of Comte it itself—at least partially—a philosophical affair. But 
philosophers alone do not determine the future of philosophy. Extra-philosophical factors—some 
political, some anthropological, and some economic—act on philosophy as well. Sometimes they 
help form it. Sometimes they reform it. Sometimes, they deform it too. And the liquidation of the 
theory of knowledge in the late nineteenth century is an example of this. This liquidation does not 
come about by philosophical causes alone. Two extra-philosophical factors that contribute to it 
and are overlooked by Habermas’ philio-sophical account are: the compartmentalization of 
knowledge brought about by the birth of the German university system; and the explosion, from 
the 1840s to the 1920s, of a series of scientific revolutions whose empirical consequences 
                                                     
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 24. 
25 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 4. 
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outstripped philosophical conceptions of the bounds of possible knowledge. Both of these events 
conspire with changes in philosophical outlook to barricade the dreams of classical epistemology 
and disengage its theory of knowledge. 
 
The Sociological Scaffolding of the Crisis: The German University  
 
The crisis of idealism comes at the same time as a crisis in philosophy’s pretensions to totality 
-Theodor Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”26 
 
In an entry for the third volume of Walter Ruegg’s History of the University in Europe, Christophe 
Charle argues that the logic of professionalization and specialization that has come to dominate 
the academic system in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is merely the protracted 
consequence of the Prussian education model promoted in the early-to-mid 1800s by the 
philosopher and state functionary Wilhelm von Humboldt, brother to the famous naturalist 
Alexander.27 According to Humboldt, whose own philosophy of education was built on the 
Enlightenment philosophy of Friedrich Schleiermacher and the humanist ideal of self-formation 
[Buildung], universities should be sites for the cultivation of free and critical thought. They should 
be subjected only to the most minimal level of state intervention, and their structure should be 
modeled after the classical image of the tree of knowledge, with Aristotle’s idea of the natural 
human desire for knowledge as the core from which specialized branches of scientific inquiry 
emanate. This approach is first embodied in the governance system and structure of the 
University of Berlin. 
 Although at the start of the nineteenth century Humboldt’s approach is only popular 
within the German context and appears to be overshadowed outside this context by the 
Napoleonic model of education born out of the First French Republic, by the last third of the 
nineteenth century this model overtakes the French one as the preeminent standard for learning 
on the continent. Perhaps on account of its less militaristic and interventionist philosophy or 
perhaps because of its more liberal policies, by the middle of the nineteenth century the 
Humboldtian approach takes root in western Europe and abroad. Walter Rüegg writes: 
 
While, at the beginning of the century, Paris had been a Mecca for scholars and scientists from 
all over the world, from the 1830s the French Government sent representatives to Germany to 
enquire about progress in higher education. In the same way, young French people, as well as 
Americans later on, trained at German universities in the new scientific methods. From the end 
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of the nineteenth century, the German model represented the modern university not only in 
Europe, but also in the United States and Japan.28 
 
This shift from Napoleon’s France to Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s Prussia has significant consequences. 
It makes Berlin rather than Paris the epicenter of intellectual life in Europe. And it facilitates the 
spread of German philosophy and literature throughout the continent. In simple terms, it enables 
the Germanization of European thought. At the time, it ramps up cultural production within 
Germany, setting the stage for what historians of ideas call ‘the Golden Age’ of German 
philosophy and literature—the age of Novalis, Rilke, and Schopenhauer.  
 But this shift, which is as much about the Germanization of Europe as it is about the 
institutionalization of philosophy, also alters in radical ways the conditions under which 
philosophical thought can take place. For many philosophers, philosophy is the very consecration 
of human thought, its splendor emanating from the fact that, unlike the other sciences, it does not 
deal with gaining knowledge about particular objects, but is the science of knowledge itself 
[Wissenschaftslehre]. The German university, however, denies this self-image and subsumes 
philosophy under it as one of its many ‘disciplines.’ In doing this, the new institutional reality 
lacerates the philosopher’s inflated sense of self-importance. With the march of the new 
university, what had once been the world-historical mission of the philosopher (or, perhaps more 
accurately, the self-understanding of the philosopher as a world-historical figure) turns into a 
practical occupation that takes place within a pre-established institutional infrastructure, under 
the auspices of the state. No longer the daimonic ‘Wise Man’ referenced by Hegel in The Philosophy 
of Right (1821)—i.e., no longer that prophetic silhouette that, perched at the zenith of history, 
stands proudly astride—the philosopher is now a mere employee, a worker whose most pressing 
duties are no longer to Spirit, Nature, or Being but to his institution, students, and research 
agenda. This is why Gadamer contends that “to the extent” that philosophers in the second half of 
the nineteenth century still take up the perennial philosophical questions, this is done from 
“within the academic horizon of the schools on the part of professors of philosophy.” In 1895, the 
philosopher Friedrich Paulsen, voicing the common concern that the university system was 
assault on philosopher’s very life activity, laments that at the close of the nineteenth century in 
Germany, the “age of absolute philosophy has been followed by an age of absolute 
unphilosophy.”29  In this sense, we may say against Heidegger that it is Hegel, rather than 
Nietzsche, who is ‘the last metaphysician’ since after his death one can no longer speak of 
metaphysicians, but only of professors of metaphysics. 
 But it is not only the philosopher’s grandiose self-image that is put under pressure by the 
institutionalization of knowledge. The philosopher’s vocation also suffers a blow. By separating 
inquiry into different fields, departments, disciplines, and areas of specialization, the university 
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system promotes a sense of ‘particularism’ that calls into question philosophy’s bid to unify all 
possible human knowledge inside a complete epistemological framework. By the late 1800s, the 
compartmentalization of knowledge has set in motion a process of epistemic balkanization that 
signals the fundamental dis-unity of knowledge and broadcasts the end of idealist epistemology. 
As new disciplines are born and as existing ones make more and more sophisticated claims to 
methodological and conceptual autonomy, questions begin to surface about whether knowledge 
is, in fact, a ‘unity’ (as philosophers historically assumed) and whether it can be ‘unified’ under a 
totalizing, genetic theory of the Kantian and Hegelian varieties. Even under the assumption that 
some form of unity remains within the reach of the thought process, it is unclear whether the 
philosopher is, so to speak, the right person for the job since the philosopher, qua professor, has 
become just one scientist among many. And how could the whole be unified from the standpoint 
of one of its parts? Mereology, previously philosophy’s doing, becomes philosophy’s undoing. 
   
 
The Scientific Scaffolding of the Crisis: Science’s Revolt 
 
The development of the sciences is as the same time their separation from philosophy and the 
establishment of their independence. 
-Martin Heidegger, “Time and Being”30 
  
Of course, the politics of the university do not bring about the dethroning of epistemology by 
themselves. What historians call the ‘second scientific revolution’ is also a factor to consider. The 
second scientific revolution is a period of European history, spanning roughly from the 1830s to 
the 1920s, in which science acquires unparalleled cultural capital and becomes a central 
determinant of the human condition, affecting every major aspect of social life from agriculture, 
technology, and law all the way to religion, medicine, and communication. In Science and Industry 
in the Nineteenth Century, John Bernal shows that during this historical period science acquires so 
much social relevance that is becomes difficult, if not impossible, to “disentangle science from the 
social and economic factors with which it is entwined.”31 More than a ‘part’ of the social totality, 
science comes into its own as the dominant thread by which the whole social fabric hangs 
together as one.  
 More than anything else, however, what makes this epoch stand out as “the age of 
science”32 is that it bears witness to a succession of scientific revolutions that shatter the classical 
frame of almost every branch of science, including mathematics, biology, chemistry, geology, 
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physics, and even logic.33 In 1830, for instance, Nikolai Lobachevsky sets the world of pure 
mathematics on fire by inventing non-Euclidean geometry through the axiomatic suspension of 
Euclid’s famous ‘fifth postulate.’ A year later, with his discovery of electromagnetic induction, 
Michael Faraday sets the groundwork for the birth of the science of electromagnetism, which 
overturns the strictly mechanical view of the world that prevailed in physics since the time of 
Gassendi, Newton, and Galileo. Similar upheavals follow Darwin’s articulation of the theory of 
evolution through natural selection, the birth of the science of probabilities (statistics), the 
creation of non-Aristotelian logics, the rise of post-Lavoisian chemistry, and the emergence of 
Louis Pasteur’s germ theory of disease. Much like the university system’s rhetoric of 
specialization and research that made them possible, these revolutions destabilize philosophy 
from without and call into question one of the central tenets of modern epistemology: the idea 
that philosophy must adopt a legislative attitude toward science.  
 The scientific discoveries just mention essentially bulldoze over many of the 
epistemological norms decreed by philosophical meta-languages. In direct defiance of 
philosophy’s self-appointed legislative authority, they disfigure philosophical conceptions of 
‘time,’ ‘space,’ ‘substance,’ and ‘causality’34 and show speculative thought to be incapable of 
accommodating the latest achievements of the sciences. Kant’s contention in the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’ that time and space are distinct forms of intuition, for instance, breaks down in the face 
of quantum physics and Einstein’s theory of special relativity, just as the necessity of his 
categories (especially the category of substance) degenerates under the pressure of new chemical 
knowledge.35 Similarly, Hegel’s account of the ideal progression of mind in the Phenomenology is 
out of joint with the actual historical development of science and his understanding of scientific 
concepts such as ‘number’ and ‘matter’ in the Logic puts his philosophy at odds with what the 
Neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer calls “the immanent progress of the sciences.”36 In “The 
Heritage of Hegel,” Gadamer argues that, much like the Kantian architectonic, the Hegelian 
dialectic, amenable as it was to the idea of change, “had little chance of escaping the resistance of 
historical research.”37  
 And it is not only particular philosophical norms that are breached by the steady advance 
of positive knowledge. It is the whole character of philosophy that is put on trial. The upheavals 
in scientific knowledge that appear during the age of science instigate a wholesale Copernican 
revolution in thought comparable to those of Copernicus in astronomy and Kant in epistemology. 
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In the sixteenth century, Copernicus showed that it is not the heavenly bodies that revolve 
around the spectator but the spectator who revolves around the stars. Two centuries later, the 
epistemologist from Königsberg tried to show that it is not our intuition that revolves around 
objects but objects that revolve around our intuition. In a similar way, what the second scientific 
revolution of the nineteenth century reveals is that it is not scientific progress that revolves 
around philosophical norms but philosophical norms that must revolve around the fact of 
scientific progress. Epistemological normativity is a byproduct of scientific and not philosophical 
reason. And this means that philosophers have to make their de jure judgments about the nature 
and limits of knowledge fit the de facto advancements of scientific discourse and justify 
themselves before the bar of science, rather than the other way around. 
 By the time the nineteenth century comes to a close, Gadamer writes, philosophy has lost 
its status as the source of legitimation and “has come to need legitimation in the face of science in 
a way that had never been true before.”38 With this emancipation of science from philosophy, the 
latter loses its legislative identity and abandons the project ascribed to it by the theory of 
knowledge—the project of unifying all possible knowledge through the erection of a normative 
meta-language. Philosophy then flees from an epistemology firmly rooted in idealism and rushes 
headfirst into a philosophy of science acquiescent to the anti-metaphysical ideology of positivism.  
 We see, then, that Habermas is right in thinking that modern epistemology meets its end 
after Hegel’s death in 1831 and in asserting that this event is precipitated by the rise of positivism 
in France. But he is off-target in attributing this event to philosophical causes alone. Yes, modern 
epistemology runs into a wall with positive philosophy. But this is only one of the factors that 
spawn the crisis in the theory of knowledge and cause the siege of epistemology by the 
philosophy of science at the start of the twentieth century. But the dis-unification of knowledge 
produced by the structure of the German university and the onslaught of scientific revolutions 
that, from the 1840s to the 1920s, flout the most basic categories of traditional epistemology and 
that in course of a few decades turn topsy-turvy philosophy’s place in the world and leave the 
philosopher on unfamiliar terrain—these factors also contribute to this impasse. They impact the 
self-image of philosophy precisely at the moment it gears up to transition from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century.  
 
Philosophy’s Entry into the Twentieth Century—An Infelicitous Start  
In my interpretation, what Köhnke calls “the death of German idealism”39 is caused by three 
equiprimordial factors: the birth of Comtean positivism, the spread throughout the European 
continent of the German university model of education, and the eruption of the second scientific 
revolution. These factors, which are intricately inter-connected, problematize what Theodor 
Adorno calls “philosophy’s pretentions to totality” and bring about what Husserl calls the 
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“decapitation”40 of the philosophical concept of knowledge. While it is more accurate to think of 
this event as the ‘death of the philosophical norm’ (or the ‘death of the concept’), what matters is 
that this historical event be grasped in its full significance as the moment philosophy relinquishes 
its post as the source of normativity and clears the way for the positive sciences to ascend to a 
position of self-determination. What matters, in other words, is that the death of German idealism 
be recognized as the site of a Second Enlightenment—the epoch in which science releases itself 
from its (partially) self-incurred philosophical tutelage and gives itself the norm. 
 Unfortunately, while this Second Enlightenment infuses science with an intoxicating 
feeling of freedom and boundlessness, it leaves philosophy in an abject state of privation in which 
all the latter can do is ponder the infelicitous question of its own existence. The almost incredible 
success of the sciences—the rapidity of their growth, the verifiability of their results, and the 
success of their methods—is so significant that, as Gutting points out, “the question gradually 
[arises] of what, if anything, there remain[s] for philosophy to do.”41 If it cannot unify or legislate, 
what can philosophy do? How will it justify itself? In the late 1800s, and while still processing the 
fact of its own abrogation, philosophy has no yet developed the theoretical resources needed to 
think through the question of its own justification, of its raison d’être. Dejected and crestfallen, all 
it can do when called upon to defend its status as a discipline is lower its previously willful gaze 
and watch helplessly as the spectacle of history washes over the memories of its once illustrious 
past. 
 But if in acknowledging science’s capacity for epistemic self-rule this second 
Enlightenment brings about the crisis of idealism that strips philosophy of its legislative attitude, 
in exposing the profoundly historical nature of scientific rationality it brings about an even more 
acute crisis in positivism that denies it (positivism, that is) the internal consistency universal 
character it claims for itself. What the many scientific discoveries and revolutions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal is that the research process occasions the genesis 
of its own normative concepts at the same time as it catalyzes the conditions for their 
transformation. What science enacts, science can also revoke.  
 This raises absorbing questions about how the normativity of scientific judgment and the 
history of science interact. How can scientific “truths” be normative and historicist at the same 
time? How can the norms science gives itself possess genuine normative content if science 
overturns them in sudden, revolutionary jolts? This is the ‘crisis in the theory of science’ that, in 
my view, follows the ‘crisis in the theory of knowledge.’ Whereas the latter, as we have seen, 
revolvs around the question of knowledge and its subjective genesis, the latter revolves around 
the question of normativity and its place in scientific history. And while the latter plateaues into 
an objectivism that gauges knowledge solely by the achievements of the sciences (i.e. positivism), 
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the former demands that philosophy re-consider and refine its understanding of science in light 
of the tension, internal to science itself, between normativity and history.  
 Although the positivist school effectively solves the crisis in the theory of knowledge by 
aborting metaphysical thinking and broadcasting to the wind the triumph of ‘fact’ over 
‘speculation,’ the two facts this school leaves unexplained are perhaps the two that matter most: 
(1) the fact that science exhibits the characteristics of a normative dialogue and (2) the fact that 
this dialogue at times succumbs to revolutionary and non-linear change. Positivism cannot 
explain either where the normativity of science comes from or why it repeatedly reinvents itself in 
time. 
 The end of the long nineteenth century, then, brings about a new situation that transforms 
philosophy considerably, a situation in which philosophy no longer stands at the pinnacle of 
human history surveying the totality of human life from that impossible perspective that Plato 
calls “a place beyond heaven.”42 In this new situation, philosophy is ‘pulled down’ from the lofty 
heights of its idealist self-understanding (where it exists as a catholic theory of all possible 
knowledge) and into the trenches of social life (where it can only exist as one discipline among 
many). And in this new world—which is our world—the surest sign that an entire age of 
philosophy has come to pass is the fact that philosophy’s most pressing concerns have shifted; 
that the problems that once served as its core points of reference have given way to a new set of 
problems that more accurately reflect its new social and historical conditions of actuality.  
 If the two fundamental questions that vex philosophical conscience in the modern period 
are “What is knowledge?” and “How is it possible?,” the two questions that completely engulf it 
at the end of the nineteenth century are “What is scientific rationality?” and “What is 
philosophy’s relationship to it?” In their proper form, these problems can be articulated as 
follows:  
 
(1) The question of scientific rationality: How can scientific rationality be simultaneously 
normative and historical, as recent developments indicate? And, 
(2)  The question of philosophy’s relationship to it: What should philosophy’s duties to, and 
expectations from, the positive sciences be? 
 
It is through these two questions that philosophy first enters the twentieth century. It is also 
through them that it becomes aware of the need to re-invent itself. These two questions, therefore, 
constitute the primal scene from which all philosophical thought in the 20th century is born. 
Again, my suspicion is that these questions—even more than questions about Kant’s 
enlightenment or Descartes’s cogito—shape the philosophical, historical and epistemological 
content of French historical epistemology.  
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 In the first half of the twentieth century there are major philosophical projects that set out 
to address the enigma of how the normative and the historical collide in the scientific and promise 
philosophy a shot at a new beginning after Comte. Among others, these include: 
 
 Neo-Kantianism (especially the so-called “Marburg School”) 
 Phenomenology (Husserl) 
 Logical Positivism (Carnap) 
 Logical Empiricism (Popper) 
 Frankfurt Critical Theory (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) 
 French Historical Epistemology (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault) 
 
Although certainly not exhaustive of the philosophical arena at the turn of the century, these 
schools represent different rejoinders to philosophy’s abject condition at the end of the age of 
science; and each seeks to overcome, in its own way and via different methods, the crisis in the 
theory of science that constitutes the long century’s true philosophical legacy (at least in the 
domain of epistemology). 
 Sadly, the first five of these philosophical behemoths fail to resolve the crisis that provokes 
and motivates them. Instead of reconciling the unmistakable normativity of scientific judgments 
and the undeniable historicity of scientific paradigms, which vexes philosophical thinking after 
the Great War, they invent new futures for philosophy by repressing one or another aspect of this 
controversy. Some, such as logical positivism, repress the historicity of science for the sake of 
buttressing its normative claims. Others, such as Frankfurt Critical Theory, repress its normativity 
so as to accommodate its historicity. Others still, neo-Kantianism and phenomenology in 
particular, succeed at the formidable task of repressing both. At any rate, all these projects prove 
incapable of “processing” the trauma of their common primal scene. They are overwhelmed 
before it, and splintered up by it too.  
 Only the last school of thought, French historical epistemology, I argue, gives us a 
plausible account of scientific rationality that does not either (a) vitiate or “reduce” the rationality 
immanent to science or (b) sacrifice its normative or historical content. In the following section I 
give a brief account of the theoretical strategies historical epistemologists deploy when thinking 
about the science-history-normativity triad and use to shed light on how these terms triangulate. 
These theoretical strategies will clarify why historical epistemology must be read as direct 
response to the two crises of the late nineteenth century—the crisis in the idealist theory of 
knowledge and the crisis in the positivist theory of science—and not simply as a re-enactment of 
eighteenth century debates about the meaning of Enlightenment rationality (as Foucault 
implies)43 or seventeenth century debates about the status of subjectivity (as Badiou contends).44  
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French Historical Epistemology And The Amputation Of The A Priori Theory Of Knowledge  
There are three main theoretical strategies members of the French school of epistemology employ 
to invent a new future for epistemology post-1910.  
 First, they abandon the a priori theory of knowledge that defines epistemology from Kant 
to Hegel, favoring instead a posteriori reflections into the history and philosophy of science. And 
although they refuse to view epistemic concepts or norms as petrified terms in a transcendental 
table of categories or as fixed moments in an ideal teleological unfolding, they nonetheless retain 
the concept of ‘the concept’ that once gave German idealism normative traction. They accept, in 
other words, that science is a normative activity. It is just that they view the norms that constitute 
it as flexible principles that evolve and change over historical time.  
 Second, they cherish rather than mourn the effects of the second scientific revolution and 
use the fact of science’s emancipation from philosophy to precipitate the reconfiguration of 
philosophy’s libidinal economy. That is to say, they demand that the set of impulses, dreams, 
desires, and fantasies that traditionally gave shape to philosophy’s imaginary be replaced with 
new motivations and ambitions that no longer make the justification of philosophy as a discipline 
contingent upon its ability to dominate and rule all other disciplines.  
 And third, they ‘re-set’ the scientific clock. By this I do not mean that they erase scientific 
history or make scientific time turn back. I simply mean that they shift the central function of 
scientific rationality—i.e., norm-generation or concept-formation—from one temporal register to 
another, from the sphere of lived time (the time of subjective experience) to the sphere of 
historical time (the time of scientific history). In direct defiance of the philosophy of subjectivity 
that was founded by Descartes and then re-founded Hegel and Husserl, historical epistemologists 
assert that scientific concepts are not formed, intuited, or constituted by subjects. They are 
constituted in history by the objective movement of scientific work. They belong to an 
autonomous temporality that is, by and large, void of subjective or experiential content.  
 Via these strategies—the a posteriori retention of the concept, the celebration of science’s 
emancipation, and the shift of the temporality of conceptuality—, French epistemologists bring 
about two important revisions of epistemological inquiry. They limit epistemological 
investigation to the study of science. (This is why, in France, the term ‘epistemology’ 
[l'épistémologie] refers not to the study of subjective intentions, motivation, and beliefs but to the 
critical practice of the history and philosophy of science).45And they limit the study of science, in 
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turn, to the interrogation of the evolutions and transformations of its concepts over historical 
time. Still, looking at each of three strategies that collaborate to bring about these revisions should 
help us understand how, and in what sense, historical epistemologists built a theoretical 
enterprise atop the ruins of the nineteenth. Let us begin with the first.  
 Like the neo-Kantians, phenomenologists, and logical positivists, historical epistemologists 
retain the notion of the a priori from the German idealists. They agree that before an epistemic 
agent can be “constituted in rationality,” as Gaston Bachelard argues in Le rationalisme appliqué, he 
or she must accede to various “principles of necessity” that give scientific experience its 
“apodictic character.”46 In the works of Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Foucault, however, these 
principles appear not as subjective categories (neo-Kantianism), structures of lived experience 
(phenomenology), or relations of pure logical necessity (logical positivism), but rather as concepts 
that rule scientific judgment and condition scientific experience from within. 
 Examples of concepts are present in virtually every major work of historical epistemology. 
In The Order of Things, for instance, Foucault talks about how the concepts of structure and 
character defined the discursive field of natural science in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries,47 
while in The Normal and the Pathological Canguilhem describes how the concepts of normality and 
pathology transfixed the epistemological possibilities of nineteenth century medical reason.48 In a 
similar fashion, Bachelard presents the concepts of resistance, blending, and synthesis as the leading 
terms that founded the epistemology of post-Lavoisian chemistry in Le matérialisme rationnel.49 For 
his part, Cavaillès focuses on some of the concepts that lie at the heart of mathematics—concepts 
such as necessity, infinity, set, magnitude, proof, and probability.50 In each case, these thinkers warn 
us against confusing these concepts with subjective ‘ideas,’ ‘intuitions,’ or ‘beliefs.’ They also 
warn us against equating them with ‘facts.’ These concepts are not subjective terms. And neither 
are they empirical observations. They are legislative and normative in nature and exist, as 
Bachelard makes clear, “above facts.”51  
 These concepts may be defined as non-subjectively constituted terms that carry 
epistemological (and not just logical) content, meaning that they are irreducible to the operations 
of classical and postclassical logics. Indeed, they are historico-normative schemas, values, or 
norms that exceed the subject of logic (logicism) as well as the logic of the Subject (subjectivism). 
Because they are not empirical facts, these concepts help French epistemologists evade the 
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glorification of the factual that defines the positive philosophy. And because they are not merely 
cultural facts (on account of their normative and epistemological content), they also help them 
take a stand against those who seek to reduce the rationality and normativity of the research 
process to social and political forces, such as Frankfurt critical theorists and the sociologists of 
scientific knowledge. Time and again, they refer to these concepts as ‘the a priori’ of (scientific) 
knowledge. 
 Where historical epistemologists end their alliance with other early-twentieth century 
thinkers who also incorporate the notion of the a priori into their theories of knowledge is that 
they adopt a curious interpretation of apriority. They do not require, and indeed forbid, that a 
priori be conceived as a-temporal or a-historical. For them, the a priori concepts that govern the 
production scientific discourse is not (or, at least, not primarily) a ‘synthetic’ or ‘formal’ a priori. it 
is a ‘historical’ ones, too—as in Foucault’s “historical a priori.”52 The latter cannot be subsumed 
under transcendental rules of subjective synthesis or be treated merely as a property of analytic 
statements. Yes, this historical a priori ensures the apodicticity of scientific knowledge and 
determines what it means to know [savoir]. But it is not an eternal norm (or norms) of reason 
existing is some supra-human realm. 
 In Historical Ontology, Ian Hacking explains the historical nature of the French a priori by 
saying that it is as inexorable as Kant’s synthetic a priori “in its time and place,” but retains a 
contingent character in relation to other historical life-worlds and time-periods.53 In “Foucault 
and the French Tradition of Historical Epistemology,” Peter Dews makes a similar claim. He 
argues that, due to their historicist reading of apriority, Bachelard and Canguilhem have to fight 
an epistemological battle on two philosophical fronts at once. To one side, they fight against 
eternalist interpretations of the a priori conditions of rational knowledge. To the other, they fight 
against relativistic theories of scientific history that would rather do without the a priori 
altogether. As such, they struggle against certain philosophies that talk about ‘pure reason’ and 
‘pure method’ as much as against others that claim that, in the absence of purity, “the enterprise 
of science as a whole can [or must] be explained by irrational determinants.”54  
 If this critical and historicist retention of the a priori (conceived as “concept”) is the first 
weapon of French epistemology, the celebration of the after-effects of what I have termed ‘the 
second Enlightenment’ is its second one. Following Dews’ suggestion, I hold that if French 
epistemologists partake in this taxing battle at both ends of the philosophical spectrum, this 
because they value not only the normativity but also the autonomy of what Bachelard dubs “the 
scientific city,”55 which represents the “effectuation of a project which is internally normed, but 
                                                     
52 See Elisabetta Basso’s “On Historicity and Transcendentality Again; Foucault’s Trajectory from Existential 
Psychiatry to Historical Epistemology,” Foucault Studies, vol. 14 (2012), 154-78. 
53 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5. 
54 Peter Dews, “Foucault and the French tradition of historical epistemology,” History of European Ideas, vol. 14 
(1992), 357. 
55 See Gaston Bachelard’s Épistémologie: Textes choisis, edited by Dominique Lecourt (Paris, FR: PUF, 1977). 
Peña-Guzmán: The nineteenth Century in Ruins 
180 
 
traversed by accidents, delayed or side-tracked by obstacles, interrupted by crises, that is to say, 
moments of judgment and of truth.”56 
 Recall that in the late nineteenth century a handful of scientific revolutions shifted the 
center of legislative gravity from philosophy to science and made it clear that the first-order 
language of science does not passively wait around for a second-order philosophical meta-
language to normalize it. These revolutions taught us that first-order scientific language “creates 
its own norms” 57  without waiting for philosophy’s Godot. 58  Some philosophical schools of 
thought, such as phenomenology, made their claim to fame in the early twentieth century 
precisely by trying to shift this center of gravity back to philosophy; by trying to return to 
philosophy the power to norm all possible knowledge. Historical epistemology, by contrast, 
makes its claim to fame by taking precisely the opposite route—by celebrating the fact that 
science has released itself from the yoke of philosophy. In a sense, the first step taken by French 
philosophers of the concept is issuing a proclamation of epistemic emancipation according to which 
the norms or concepts that make of epistemology a worthwhile vocation are the accomplishment 
of science, not philosophy. Science authors its own norms. And this capacity for self-rule that 
philosophy ditch its historical will-to-master; that it face up to the reality that it can no longer 
role-play as the “queen” of the sciences or as the “super-ego”59 of the scientific mind. Why? 
Simply because science has become autonomous and developed a super-ego ideal fashioned after 
its own image.60  
 This celebration of science’s escape from un-freedom prompts a sweeping re-description of 
the philosopher’s job. We have seen that, from Kant to Hegel, the philosopher’s job is to attend to 
a present state of scientific knowledge, scrutinize it with the tools of logico-transcendental 
analysis, and then craft an ideal and normative meta-language to normalize and justify it. The 
presuppositions here being, of course, (a) that there exist universal norms of rational thought, (b) 
that these norms are operative in the exercise of scientific judgment and (c) that only the 
philosopher, with the aid of philosophy’s methods, can grab a hold of them. But when the job of 
norming scientific knowledge starts being done ‘in-house’ by science itself, the philosopher finds 
herself without a post. What is she to do?  
 From the standpoint of historical epistemology, the philosopher’s options are limited. In 
fact, they are limited to only one option: the philosopher mutate from an idealist to a non-idealist 
(read: historical) epistemologist. In this capacity, the philosopher can still be said to ‘justify’ 
scientific knowledge but not by legislating into existence, as if by fiat, norms to which science 
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must acquiesce. Rather, he or she “justifies” scientific reason by showing contemporary science to 
be a rational consequent of its own historical past, by articulating genealogies of systems of 
knowledge. Because neither logical nor transcendental analysis can return philosophy to the 
throne, philosophy must adapt to its post-patrician conditions of existence. And the sole 
adaptation at its disposal is the one already identified by Nietzsche: “historical philosophizing.” 
In this type of philosophizing, there still is room for the existence a priori. But the a priori is not 
something that philosophy ‘founds’ or ‘generates.’ It is something it ‘maps.’ Philosophy looks for 
the a priori (in the form of the dispersion of concepts) in the historical landscapes of scientific 
rationality. And, when it finds it, it maps it. But philosophy, by itself, cannot beget it. It can only 
receive it from its newly emancipated outside.  
 Curiously, the commemoration of the newly found epistemic freedom of the sciences does 
more than steer the epistemologist in the direction of a genealogical method. In severing any and 
all ties between it and the theory of knowledge, it also revolutionizes the very meaning of 
“epistemology.” Let us stress that French epistemologists do not simply maintain that 
epistemology must become more sensitive to scientific knowledge. Theirs is a much more drastic 
position. They hold that scientific knowledge must become epistemology’s sole possibility. Here, 
as the French philosopher François Regnault has observed, ‘epistemology’ is defined “as relative 
to science or to the sciences.”61 It ceases to be coextensive with an a priori theory of knowledge in 
the tradition of Kant and Hegel and becomes an a posteriori reflection on the history of the sciences 
in the tradition of Comte and Brunschvicg.  
 The Spanish philosopher Francisco Jarauta contends in La filosofía y su otro (Bachelard, 
Cavaillès, Canguilhem, Foucault) that the penetrating analyses of the history of the sciences that 
emanate from the Sorbonne from the 1930s to 1970s share one and only one absolute 
commonality: they are all grounded not on philosophy itself but on ‘the Other of philosophy,’ 
which is to say, the history of the sciences. Drawing a comparison, one could say that in the same 
way that Kant appeals to practical reason as the norm-testing court of appeal for questions of 
morality, French epistemologists appeal to the history of the sciences as the norm-testing court of 
appeal for questions of epistemology. In the depths of this ‘Other,’ the philosophy of the concept 
finds its sustenance, life-source, and point of departure. 
 All of this to say that French historical epistemology is born on the eve of the first World 
War as the refutation of the theory of knowledge. It negates the latter’s de-coupling of a priority 
and historicity and rejects its claim that philosophers should be in the business of articulating a 
normative meta-language that stands ‘over’ or ‘under’ science either as its ‘queen’ or as its 
‘ground.’ And, to be clear, the idea of ‘amputation’ is more than just a manner of speaking since, 
as Merleau-Ponty has shown in relation to embodied subjects, the amputation of a limb results in 
more than just the deprivation or silencing of a certain capacity. In a powerful sense, an 
amputation creates a new sense of lived time in the subject who undergoes it. In a similar fashion, 
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the amputation of the theory of knowledge does more than simply deny philosophy access to a 
particular way of thinking about science. This amputation readjusts the temporality of 
epistemology and gives birth to a new way of thinking about the temporality in which scientific 
concepts are constituted. This re-adjustment of the temporality of knowledge is the third 
maneuver that defines French epistemology. 
 The most important function of the classical theory of knowledge is to explain the origins 
of knowledge. This theory sets for itself the task of finding a temporal register into which concepts 
can be born, that is to say, a temporal register that houses the process or activity of concept-
generation. In the modernity that stretched from Kant to Hegel, the temporal register that 
performs this function is the temporality of consciousness. What makes possible the formation 
and appearance of concepts is the temporality of the ‘I,’ independently of whether this is 
conceived as a transcendental unity of apperception (Kant), the absolute ground of all that is 
(Fichte), or self-identity in otherness (Hegel). But historical epistemologists reject the ‘I’—or 
‘consciousness’—as a founding principle of epistemology. As far as they are concerned, the ‘I’ 
represents a vestige of the classical theory of knowledge that any critical epistemology would do 
well to do without. This raises a simple problem. If the temporality of consciousness is no longer 
admitted as an axiom of epistemology, what temporal register will substitute it as the origin of 
concept-formation?  
 French epistemologists give an express answer: the temporality of the history of the 
sciences. This temporal domain is nothing like the subjective time that Kant presents as a ‘pure 
form of intuition’ or the stream of appearances that Husserl dubs ‘the internal time of 
consciousness.’ This is a temporality without an Ego or Subject. As such, we may say that for 
Cavaillès, Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Foucault, concept-formation rides the crest of scientific 
history such that it is the history of science rather than the time of subjective experience that, 
properly speaking, concepts are born into. Epistemology’s first order of business, therefore, must 
be to time-travel from the subjective time of the Cogito to the non-subjective time of the history of 
science. If it succeeds at this task, epistemology becomes worthy of its name. If it does not, 
epistemology fails at being epistemological.  
  
Concluding Remarks  
We know that in Paris, following the end of WWI, epistemology was subjected to a series of 
theoretical dislodgments: it was divorced from the method of a priori theorizing that once defined 
‘great’ philosophy; its conceptual structure was cracked open by the historicist provocations of 
post-Kantian philosophy; its legislative spirit was defied by science; and it was, in a very real 
sense, institutionalized. Needless to say, these dislodgements—which, together, constitute 
historical epistemology’s historical conditions of emergence—pelted and bruised philosophy’s ego 
and controverted its self-understanding as the source of epistemic normativity par excellence. But 
they also did something else: they brought about the historical and theoretical conditions that 
made it possible for philosophy to project itself onto the European context in a radically new way. 
They allowed philosophy to re-invent itself and step into the currents of twentieth century life no 
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longer as an idealist and universal theory of knowledge but rather as a historically sensitive and 
socially aware ‘philosophy of the concept,’ as a ‘historical epistemology.’ What our analysis here 
indicates is that this metamorphosis was not exclusively the work of philosophy’s internal 
dialectic. It was the product of a dense and saturated background in which philosophical and 
extra-philosophical forces were at play (e.g., the advancement of science, the march of history, the 
rise of the university structure). 
 It cannot be disputed that many experienced the collapse of normative epistemology in the 
nineteenth century as evidence of the breakdown of ‘real’ epistemology, i.e., as a sign of the 
corruption of philosophy by its outside. But it cannot be denied that some also experienced this 
transition in a different way, as the opening up of philosophy’s horizon, as a valuable 
opportunity for the simultaneous overhaul of moth-eaten philosophical ambitions and the 
renovation of epistemology’s critical project. For those in the second category, the ruin of one 
century bore lovely fruit in the next. As Nietzsche candidly put it in The Gay Science: “the times of 
corruption are those when the apples fall from the tree.” And, in the late nineteenth, many an 
apple did fall from philosophy’s normative tree. Sign of corruption? Perhaps! But “corruption,” as 
Nietzsche also says, is all-too-frequently “merely a nasty word for the autumn of a people.”62 
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